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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Torrey Lee Friedrich appeals from his convictions for driving under the
influence and grand theft. Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress in the driving under the influence case and asserts the district court
abused its sentencing discretion in both cases.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Friedrich was arrested in his driveway for driving on a suspended license.
(Tr., p.38, L.21 - p.39, L.24.) Following further investigation, including obtaining
Friedrich's breath alcohol content of .092/.091, the state charged Friedrich with
felony driving under the influence (enhanced by two prior convictions for driving
under the influence), DWP and possession of an open container. (R., pp.52-53.)
The state also charged Friedrich with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.58-59.)
Friedrich filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in his driving
under the influence case, claiming he had been "illegally stopped, detained and
questioned."

(R., pp.80-82.)

Following a hearing, the district court denied

Friedrich's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.1.)
The state charged Friedrich in an unrelated case with grand theft by
possession after he was found with stolen computer equipment and a stolen
camera in his vehicle. (R., pp.150-151.)
In a global resolution, Friedrich entered conditional guilty pleas to felony
driving under the influence and grand theft by possession with the state
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withdrawing the persistent violator enhancement on the driving under the
influence case and agreeing not to file a persistent violator enhancement and
dismissing remaining charges on the grand theft case. (Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.59,
L.5; R., pp.108-117, 153-160.)

As part of the plea agreement, Friedrich

preserved the right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. (Tr.,
p.58, Ls.14-17; R., pp.109-110.)

Further, as part of the agreement, the state

bound itself to a recommendation of four years fixed followed by six years
indeterminate on the driving under the influence charge and four years fixed
followed by 10 years indeterminate on the grand theft charge, to be served
concurrently, with Friedrich able to argue for a lesser sentence. (Tr., p.59, Ls.1325.)
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of three years
fixed followed by seven years indeterminate and recommended that Friedrich be
placed in the Therapeutic Community. (Tr., p.90, Ls.12-21; R., pp.123-125, 167169.) Friedrich timely appeals. (R., pp.119-122, 164-166.)
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ISSUES
Friedrich states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr.
Friedrich's motion to suppress because the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion to justify the warrantless
detention of Mr. Friedrich.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing
excessive sentences on Mr. Friedrich in the two cases on
appeal.

(Appellant's brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Friedrich failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
suppression motion?
2. Has Friedrich failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing concurrent sentences of three years fixed followed by
seven years indeterminate upon his pleas of guilty to felony driving under the
influence and grand theft by possession?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Friedrich Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Friedrich's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.47, L.24 -

p.48, L.1.) Friedrich argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because his initial detention was not based on reasonable
suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Friedrich's claim fails. A review of the
record, in light of the applicable legal standards, supports the conclusion that the
officer had sufficient cause to detain Friedrich and determine if he was driving on
a suspended driver's license.

As such, the district court did not err when it

denied Friedrich's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 4856, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309
(2004).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
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C.

Friedrich Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying
His Motion To Suppress
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment

standard of reasonableness.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700

(1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must
be supported by probable cause. 15;L_ at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause
requirement.

For example, it is well-settled that a police officer may, in

compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1968); State v. Bishop. 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person .... [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App.
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience
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and law enforcement training.").

"Whether an officer possessed reasonable

suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at
1210 (citations omitted).
Here, the officer had information that Friedrich had a suspended driver's
license and had been driving on the suspended license one week earlier. (Tr.,
p.17, L.5 - p.19, L.21.) The officer also knew where Friedrich lived and what
kind of vehicle he drove in addition to knowing what he looked like from prior
contacts with Friedrich. (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-22; p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.4; p.23, Ls.1125.) Armed with this information, the officer parked on Friedrich's street after
determining Friedrich's car was not in his driveway. (Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.22, L. 13.)
The officer observed a car that looked like Friedrich's car drive toward Friedrich's
house and park in Friedrich driveway. (Tr., p.22, L.14 - P. 23, L.25.) Believing it
was Friedrich and observing the vehicle fishtail on the icy road, the officer "pulled
up into his driveway behind his vehicle and initiated a traffic stop." (Tr., p.24,
Ls.22-23.) When the officer walked up to the vehicle and turned his spotlight on
the driver, he was able to confirm the driver was in fact Friedrich.

(Tr., p.31,

Ls.10-17.)
Friedrich contends on appeal that this initial approach by the officer was
unlawful, claiming that at or before the officer initiated the detention of Friedrich,
"he had no information upon which he could base a reasonable suspicion that
this driver was driving contrary to the law, and thus, had no reasonable suspicion
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upon which to justify a warrantless detention of that driver." (Appellant's brief,
p.10.) Friedrich is incorrect.
Although the district court incorrectly concluded there was no traffic stop
because Friedrich had pulled into his own driveway 1 (Tr., p.46, Ls.10-12), it
correctly identified the information supporting reasonable suspicion available to
the officer at the time he approached Friedrich in his driveway:
I also find that what happened was in this case, and it's not
remarkable, it happens in many cases, is that the officer in this
case had been briefed by other officers that the defendant was
driving on a suspended license out of Oregon.
The officer does have an understanding of where the
defendant lives and what his vehicle looks like, and as a result of a
prior week's contact, they do have information on a car being
registered to this particular defendant.
So when the officer sees him driving and drives up behind
him and shines his spotlight and confirms that the driver is the
driver that the officer knows is operating on a suspended license,
there's no problem whatsoever with him taking him into custody,
because there is probable cause to arrest this defendant at that
point on driving while his driving privileges are suspended.
(Tr., p.46, L.13 - p.47, L.6.)
The information known to the officer gave him reasonable suspicion to
believe Friedrich was driving with a suspended driver's license.

Although the

officer was not able to positively identify Friedrich until after he had activated his
overhead lights, he knew that Friedrich had, just one week earlier, been driving a
vehicle that matched the description of the vehicle he saw pulling into Friedrich's
driveway. The officer also knew Friedrich's driver's license was suspended. The

1

Although the district court found there was no traffic stop, the state concedes
the officer did detain Friedrich when he angled his patrol vehicle in the driveway
behind Friedrich and activated his overhead lights. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1-12.)
7

totality of the circumstances known to the officer justified a temporary detention
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion that Friedrich was indeed the driver
and was driving without a valid license.
Friedrich asserts the "officer did not premise the detention of Mr. Friedrich
on the status of his driver's license, [so] it should not be considered as a potential
basis upon which to justify the stop." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) This argument
fails for two reasons. First, the presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective
test that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes.
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v.
State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996).

Second, the officer did premise his

detention on the status of Friedrich's driver's license. The officer testified that
Friedrich's driving status was the very reason he was in Friedrich's neighborhood
that evening (see Tr., p.20, L.1 - p.22, L.13) and approached him in his driveway
after observing his driving pattern 2 in addition to the knowledge of Friedrich's
license suspension:
Q. [by defense counsel]:
Go over a couple things with you here.
The only reason you made contact with the vehicle was because of
the fishtail; correct?

A.
And I was pretty sure that it was Mr. Friedrich driving the
vehicle, and still knowing that he was suspended.

2

The district court determined "5 to 10 miles an hour is quite a reasonable way to
handle the snow" (Tr., p.14, Ls.22-23) in finding the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion that Friedrich was operating the vehicle in an unsafe
manner. The state does not challenge this conclusion.
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(Tr., p.28, Ls.18-23.)

Although Friedrich attempted to impeach the officer's

testimony with his prior testimony from the preliminary hearing, the officer
testified as to his knowledge of Friedrich's suspension then as well:
Q. [by defense counsel]: Was that the only reason you made
contact with the vehicle at that time, then, was because you saw
the fishtailing?
A.

Was it the only reason?

Q.

Yes.

Well, I actually knew that the defendant lived there, and but, yes, that was the violation, why I stopped him and made
contact with him.

A.

(PH Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.7.) This testimony is not conflicting. The officer was
in Friedrich's neighborhood the night of his arrest to see if he was again driving
with a suspended license after having avoided being charged with driving on a
suspended license a week earlier.

The officer saw Friedrich's vehicle

approaching Friedrich's house in what he deemed to be an unsafe manner. With
that and the knowledge that Friedrich's driver's license was suspended, the
officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him in order positively identify
him and confirm his driving status.
Friedrich has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
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11.
Freid rich Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's
Discretion

A

Introduction
Friedrich argues the district court abused its discretion in imposing

concurrent sentences of three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate
on each of Friedrich's felony convictions, claiming the court "imposed both
sentences without sufficiently considering the recognized sentencing objectives
or the mitigation factors present in this case." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Friedrich
has failed to meet his burden of establishing the excessiveness of his sentences
and has thereby failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate

court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v.
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope,
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v.
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Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490
(1992).

C.

Friedrich Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Sentencing
To establish that his sentences are excessive, Friedrich must demonstrate

that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and punishment or retribution. In this case, the district court noted in sentencing
Friedrich that it had little faith in his self-proclaimed ability to successfully
complete a second lifetime retained jurisdiction program where
the reality is, you are coming before the court on a fifth felony, and
you have multiple misdemeanors on your record, and you have a
juvenile record, and so the evidence in this file is - doesn't back up
a person that the court should have confidence about.
The evidence in the file is also that you were paroled
multiple times, and you violated your parole multiple times. So the
evidence - the honest truth is, the evidence is not there to back up
what you are saying, that you see things differently.
(Tr., p.86, L.15 - p.87, L.2.) The district court discussed at length Friedrich's
previous opportunities for rehabilitation and the lack of an actual desire or ability
to change his ways based on the observations of his past behavior. (See Tr.,
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p.86, L.15 - p.89, L.16.)

The court also determined there was a need for a

punishment while acknowledging the possibility of future change:
And so I do think that a penalty is appropriate. I don't think
that I could say from any evidence before me that you are at a point
of change, but I don't preclude the fact that you might be moving to
that place where you are, so - but I think you are going to have to
spend a lot more work on changing directions, not just talking about
changing directions.
(Tr., p.90, Ls.3-10.)

In imposing sentence, the district court mentioned the

support Friedrich had in his life (Tr., p.90, Ls.22-25) and gave him the opportunity
to advance his rehabilitation by recommending he be placed in the Therapeutic
Community (Tr., p.90, Ls.16-21 ).
The district court's concurrent unified sentences of 10 years with three
years fixed for Friedrich's convictions for driving under the influence and grand
theft were entirely reasonable in light of the nature of the crimes, Friedrich's
significant criminal record, and his lack of amenability to rehabilitation. Friedrich
has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denial of Friedrich's motion to suppress and to uphold Friedrich's judgments of
conviction and sentences.
Dated this 30 th day of January 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30 th day of JANUARY 2013 served a
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
BRIAN R DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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